This paper examines the implications of adverse selection in the private annuity market for the pricing of private annuities and the consequent effects on constrption and bequest behavior. With privately known heterogeneous mortality probabilities, adverse selection causes the rate of return on private annuities to be less than the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. However, a fully funded social security system with compulsory participation can offer an implied rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. Thus, since social security offers a higher rate of return than private annuities, consumers cannot completely offset the effects of social security by transacting in the private annuity market. Using an overlapping generations model with uncertain lifetimes, we demonstrate that the introduction of actuarially fair social security reduces the steady state rate of return on annuities and raises the steady state levels of average bequests and average consumption of the young.
Uncertainty about an individual's date of death affects the individual's consumption and portfolio behavior as well as the bequest ultimately left to the consumer's heirs. The early literature on lifetime uncertainty' focused on the effects of stochastic lifetimes on individual consumption and portfolio behavior, ignoring the effects on the bequests received by subsequent generations.2 Much recent attention has been devoted to the effects of stochastic lifetimes on bequests and the implications for the distribution of wealth and the evolution of the capital stock. Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) extended the Modigliani-Brumberg (1954) -Samuelson (1958) -Diamond (1965) overlapping generations model to include uncertain lifetimes. They assumed that all consumers are identical and, furthermore, that all consumers in a given cohort die at the same date, thereby leaving identical bequests. However, if consumers die at different dates, then they will, in general, leave bequests of different sizes. Abel (1985) and Eckstein, Eichenbauni and Peled (1985) exploited the iritra-cohort variation in ex post mortality experiences to analyze the steady state distributions of bequests, consumption and wealth in models without private annuity markets and with consumers without bequest motives.3 Abel (1985) also shows that the introduction of fully funded social security crowds out steady state private wealth by more than one-for-one and that it reduces all central moments of the steady state distribution of wealth.
The effects of social security in the presence of uncertain lifetimes have been studied by Sheshiuski and Weiss (1981) and Abel (1985) in models in which there is no private annuity market. However, if a competitive annuity market were introduced into these models, social security would then have no effect because the rate of return on private annuities would be the same as the rate of return implicit in actuarially fair fully funded social security; thus consi.ers would exactly offset the effects of social security by adjusting their purchases of private annuities. In this paper 'we introduce a private market for annuities and demonstrate that with privately-known heterogenous mortality probabilities, social security does have real effects on the allocation of consumption. The reason is that adverse selection drives the rate of return on competitively supplied annuities below the actuarially fair rate of return based on the population average cx ante mortality probability; however, because the social security system is compulsory, it is immune to adverse selection and a fully funded system can offer a rate of return equal to the actuarially fair rate based on population average mortality. Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled (1985b) examine the welfare-enhancing role of mandatory social security when the private annuity market is subject to adverse selection.4 However, there are two features of their model which make it unsuitable for our purposes. First, because they assume that consumers have no bequest motive, the availability of annuities implies, as noted by Yaari (1965) , that consumers will hold all of their savings as annuities, and hence there will be no private intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests. Second, because the consumption good is a non-producible, nonstorable endowment, aggregate savings is zero in every period; the saving of the young is exactly offset by the dissaving of the old. In contrast, in the model presented below, the specification of the utility function with a bequest motive introduces a non-trivial portfolio allocation problem and leads to intergenerational transfers in the form of bequests. Secondly, in the model below, the consumption good can be invested at a rate of return R so that aggregate saving need not be zero. Thus, this model can be used to analyze the effects of social security on capital accumulation.
In section I, we examine the optimal consumption and portfolio behavior of an individual consumer, taking as given the rate of return on private annuities and the consumer's inheritance received from his parent. Using the derived demands for private annuities by consumers with different mortality probabilities, we study, in section II, the determination of the rate of return on private annuities. In section III, we analyze the steady state effects of introducing actuarially fair fully funded social security. We show that the introduction of fully funded social security leads to an increase in the steady state consumption of young consumers, an increase in the steady state level of bequests, and to a reduction in the rate of return on private annuities. Finally, we show that depending on strength of the bequest motive, an actuarially fair increase in social security taxes will crowd out private capital by greater than or less than one-for-one.
Consumption and Portfolio Behavior of an Individual
Consider a consumer who may live either one period (with probability p>O) or two periods (with probability l-p>O). Let I be the initial wealth held by the consumer at the beginning of his life.
(The determination of I will be discussed below.) During the first period of life the consumer earns a fixed labor income Y, pays a social security tax T, and consumes an amount If the consumer survives to the end of the second period, he receives a social security payment S, consumes an amount C2, and gives the remainder of his wealth, Bs, to his heir. Since all uncertainty is resolved at the beginning of the second period., the consumer who lives for two periods knows at the beginning of the second period that he will leave a bequest of Bs where
We assume that the consumer who survives gives his heir the bequest Bs at the beginning of the second period.
Thus, regardless of whether the consumer lives one period or two periods, the intergenerational transfer from the consumer to his heir takes place at the beginning of the second period i.e., at the beginning of the first period of the heir's life.
Let the consumer's utility function be
where & (O<&11) is the one-period discount factor, U( ) is a strictly concave utility index of the conser's own consumption and V( ) is a strictly concave index of utility derived from leaving a bequest. The utility function in (1) is simply the expected value of utility, where the only stochastic element is the consumer's date of death.5
The consumer maximizes the utility function in (3) Then combining (1) and (4) to eliminate Q yields
Substituting the lifetime budget constraint (5) into the utility function (3) and differentiating with respect to c1, c2, and B' respectively, yields
Annuities are said to be actuarially fair if the expected rate of return on an annuity, (i-p)A, is equal to the rate of return on riskless bonds, R.
Note that actuarial fairness implies that = -a--so that from (6c) we R i-p obtain VP(BD) = V'(B5) and hence BD Bs. Furthermore, since BD Bs, it follows from (4) that c2 = QA + S.6 Thus, if the rate of return on private annuities is actuarially fair, the consumer's portfolio consists of: (1) riskiess bonds which will be given to his heir as a bequest; and (2) annuities which, along with the social security payment S, will be used to provide for second-period consumption.
If the expected rate of return on annuities is smaller than the riskiess rate of return R, i.e., A < 1A_ then it follows from (6c) that V'(BP) < V'(B) so that BD > B3 and (from (4)) C2 > QA + S. In this case the Consumer does not use annuities to provide for all of second-period consumption; some of second-period consumption is provided for by riskiess bonds which have a higher expected rate of return than annuities.7
In order to obtain explicit solutions for the optimal levels of consump-1-a_1 tion and bequests, we assume that U(c)= and V(B)-, as in Hakansson (1969), Fischer (1973) and Richard (1975) , where ?>O indicates the strength of the bequest motive and a>O. Therefore the utility function in (3) is ]iomothetic, and the income expansion path for c1, c2, ED and Bs is a ray through the origin. The optimal value of each of these variables, as well as the demand for contingent second-period income QA+S, is proportional to the expected present value of lifetime resources I + Y -T +AS. It is shown in
Explicit expressions for ô(p,A) and q1(p,A) are presented in Appendix A. It can be shown that 8q1/a < 0. Also, q1(p,A) will be positive if and only if 1 A > N1_) + ( )U] • R (9) 1 + a If S=O, then (9) is necessary and sufficient for a positive demand for annuities. With actuarially fair annuities (A=1-), (9) is satisfied.
It is convenient to rewrite (8), the demand for private annuities as
Since Q1(p,A) < 1 and 8q118p < 0, it follows from (lOb) that q2(p,A) > 0 and 8 q2 that -> 0. Therefore, if I+Y-T > 0 and S > 0, then ap -< .
(11) II.
Equilibrium in the Private Annuity Market
Suppose that consers are characterized by different probabil ities, p, of dying young. We will refer to a consner with a probability p of dying young as a type p consumer. Except for the difference in p, all consumers have identical utility functions. Let E(p) be the fraction of young consumers with probability of dying young less than or equal to p. The support of the dis-
We restrict the range of values of p in the population by assuming that that
The effect of this assumption is to guarantee that condition (9) is satisfied so that if S>0 is sufficiently small, then all consumers will have a positive demand for annuities.8 A consumer's probability of dying young, p, is independent of the p of his parent. Moreover, we assume that each individual knows his own value of p but that annuity companies and the government are unable to determine an individual consumer's p. e assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty; a fraction p of each cohort of type p consumers will die young. Finally, we assume that annuity companies cannot determine whether an individual consumer holds annuities from other insurance companies. The effect of this assumption is that the equilibrium in the annuity market will be a pooling equilibrium rather than a separating equilibrium.9
Assuming that annuity companies are risk-neutral and perfectly competitive, the expected profits of annuity companies must be equal to zero. Let M(p,A) be the expected profit per dollar of annuity with rate of return A issued to a type p consumer. Therefore
so thai = A > 0. It is obvious that the equilibrium rate of return on ap annuities, A, must lie between R and R : if A were less than R , then 1-p11 an annuity company could offer a rate higher than A and profitably attract all buyers of annuities; if A were greater than R then annuity companies would 1-p11 suffer expected losses on all annuities sold.
We will now show that the competitive rate of return on annuities, A, must be less than A, the actuarially fair rate based on population average (11)), the lemma implies that the first integral in (15) is negative.
Since (for S sufficiently nall) the second integral in (15) 
where A(.,.) is homogeneous of degree zero.
To demonstrate that aA/,3S < 0, recall from (lOa) that an increase in social security benefits leads type p consumers to reduce their demand for 0 q2 private annuities by q2(p,A). Since > 0, consumers with high p reduce their annuity demands by more than low p consumers. Furthermore, since high p consumers begin with a lower demand for annuities than low p consumers, the percentage reduction in annuity demand is greatest for high p consumers. Now, since it is the annuities sold to the high p consumers on which annuity companies expect positive profits, this shift in the composition of annuity holders away from the profitable (high p) consumers leads to a reduction in expected profits. In order to restore zero expected profits, the equilibrium rate of return A must fall (since n'(A) < 0). Thus, the partial derivatives ) where I is the initial bequest (per capita) received at birth; At is the rate of return on annuities purchased at the end of period t (and which pay off in period t+1). An expression for 6(pAt) is given iii Appendix A. We will asse that O<e (p1A) 
where = e(pAt)an(p) (20b) In the steady state B = I so that (dropping the time subscript) (20a) may be rewritten as
1-(A)
We assume that A fully funded social security system operates by collecting T from each young consumer and investing the proceeds in riskiess capital earning a gross rate of return R. In the following period the social security tax cum interest, RT, is divided equally among the surviving consumers. Since a fraction 1-p of the consumers survives to the second period, the payment S received by each surviving consumer is S=AT (22) where we recall that is defined as RJ(1-. Equation (22) shows that the marginal rate of return implicit in the social security system, 4, is A which, as we have shown in Section II, is greater than A, the equilibrium rate of return on private annuities. Therefore,. an actuarially fair increase in social security taxes and benefits increases the expected present value lifetime income I + Y -T + A1S, for a given level of inherited wealth I.
We will confine our attention to a small increase in S and T starting frc am initial steady state in which S=O. It follows immediately from (lTb) that a(I*+Y_T)I S=O = 0 so that dAt -8A < 0 (23)
S=0 -
Thus, an increase in fully funded social security reduces the steady state -13rate of return on annuities.
Henceforth, we asse that a1 (logarithmic utility) so that, as shown in With logarithmic utility, (A) is invariant to A. Therefore, the effect of social security on 4 is proportional to the effect on B*+Y_T+AT'S which increases as a result of three effects: (1) B* rises as shown in (25); (2) since the gross return on social security, SIT, exceeds A, it follows that -T+AS rises for a given A; and (3) A falls as shown in (23) 
-(1-(A))2
1-(A)
Since '(A)<O it follows from (23) that the first term on the right hand side of (29) is positive. Since A>A 1 the second term on the right hand side of (29) will be positive if <(A)<1. In this case, the right hand side of (29) is unambiguously positive so that the introduction of fully funded social security will increase the steady state natci capits. stck Appendix C provides conditions under .bich ((A)<i. Lt.itive1y. the beç'est motive as measured by X must be sufficiently strong so that a iarer share of lifetime resources is devoted to beq.ests than to firt-period onsptin.
In the case in which the first term on the right band side of (29) remains positive, but the second term is negative. Observe that if )O, then and the first term om the right band side of becomes zero.
Thus, if the bequest motive is sufficiently weak, then an in fully funded social security will rethce the total national pitai took in the steady state. Thus we have shown
IV. Conclusion
In this paper 'we have developed an overlapping generations model based on individual utility maximization subject to uncertainty about the date of death. We used this model to examine the dynamic behavior of consimption and bequests in an econcny 'with consiuners who have different probabilities of dying. Even though there are markets in annuities and in riskless bonds, consumers are unable to offset the introduction of actuarially fair social security. The reason is that adverse selection in the private annuity market leads to a rate of return on private annuities which is lower than the rate of return implicit in compulsory social security.
The introduction of actuarially fair social security raises the steady state average levels of bequests and first-period consimption; it reduces the steady state rate of return on private annuities. If the bequest motive is sufficiently weak, then an increase in fully funded social security benefits reduces private wealth by more than one-for--one. With a sufficiently strong bequest motive, an increase in social security taxes crowds out private wealth by less than one-for-one. The seminal work in this area is Yaari (1965) , which provided the framework for later work by Eakausson (1969) , Fischer (1973) , Richard (1975) , Levhari and Mirnian (1977) , Barro and Friedman (1977) and Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) .
2.
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) examine the role of the family in providing an (incomplete) annuities market but stop short of a full-scale overlapping generations model in which the intra-cohort distribution of bequests is determined endogenously.
3.
See Kotlikoff, Shoven and Spivak (1983) and Karni and Zilcha (1984) for interesting extensions of the overlapping generations model in which consumers within a cohort have different ex post mortality experiences.
4.
Their analysis is more general than an analysis of annuity markets which are based on lifetime uncertainty; it applies more generally to mandatory insurance as a partial remedy for adverse selection in insurance markets.
In particular, Eckstein, Eichenbaum and Peled pay careful attention to various concepts of equilibrium.
5.
We follow Yaari (1965 ), Hakansson (1969 , Fischer (1973) and Richard (1975) in specifying utility as a function of the size of the bequest left to one's heir. An alternative formulation which also gives rise to a bequest motive is to specify utility as a function of one's heir's utility as in Barro (1974) and Drazen (1978) .
The specification of utility as a function of the size of the bequest left to one's heir was chosen for tractability. The substantive results of this paper do not depend on choosing this specification rather than the specification suggested by Barro (1974) . In particular, the fast that social security affects consumption and capital accumulation depends, not on the particular specification of the bequest motive, but rather on the fact that adverse selection drives a wedge between the rates of return on social security and on private annuities. In the absence of adverse selection, fully funded social security would not affect consumption regardless of whether the bequest motive is specified as in this paper or as in Barro (1974) .
6.
Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) have derived a similar result in a model which is similar in spirit, but different in detail from the model in this paper.
7.
If A > j, then all of the results in this paragraph are reversed.
8.
To derive this implication, we observe that (as will be argued below) competition in the annuity market will prevent the rate of return A from being less than holds. Note that the term on the left of the first inequality in (12) is less than pH since this term can be written as
])1E Therefore, given H X, and a, the set of possible values for is not empty.
Since we have shown that (12) The Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) demonstration that there cannot be a pooling equilibrium depends on their assumption "that customers can buy only one insurance contract". As they point out themselves, "this is an objectionable assumption" (p. 632). The appropriate equilibrium concept in the presence of monitoring of purchases from other companies still requires further research. The equilibrium described in this paper has some desirable characteristics and is suitable for our purposes. L p 11. More generally, when a is not equal to one we ave not ruled out multiple roots of ir(A) = 0 in the interval ( L'-Nonetheless, we can rule out as possible equilibria those ro fo1rwhich i'(A) > 0 by observing that if such an A were the prevailing rate of return on private annuities, a firm could offer a slightly higher rate of return and profitably attract all annuity purchases. Thus the equilibrium rate A is characterized by n'(A) < 0. Henceforth, we assume that this inequality holds strictly.
12. See Appendix C for conditions under which O(p,A)<1.
13. In Appendix C, we present condition under which O<e(A)<1. Theseconditions guarantee that B*>O if Y-T+A S>O and will guarantee that B approaches the steady state B* monotonically.
14. It can also be shown that wth with logarithmic utility the introduction of actuarially fair social security leads to an increase in the amount of riskiess bonds held in the portfolios of young consumers. This result fllows froin1the fact that riskless bond holdings are proportional to A(I+Y-T+A S). (Substitut4g (A-3b) into (A15b) i Appendix A and then sehing e equal to 1 yields 6 = [I+&(l-p+X)1 p&.Rj.) Since theAintro_ duction of social security leads to a reduction in X, the factor rises. We have already shown that the steady state expected presen value of lifetime income rises with the introduction of social security.
To obtain an expression for BD, substitute (A3-a) into (A-ic) which yields BD = OD(p,A)(I+y_T+A-is) 
